Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2006

The Endorsement Court
Jay D. Wexler
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay D. Wexler, The Endorsement Court , in 21 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 263 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1705

This Article is brought to you for free and open access
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

The Endorsement Court
Jay D. Wexler*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1986, when William H. Rehnquist was confirmed as the
sixteenth Chief Justice of the United States, 1 the Supreme Court has
virtually rewritten the entire law regarding the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses. 2 With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court, in its 1990 Employment Division v. Smith 3 decision, reversed
years of jurisprudence and held that the First Amendment does not
entitle religious believers to exemptions from neutral laws of general
application. On the Establishment Clause side, the Court recently
overturned a series of its earlier decisions on its way to creating a
body of law quite amenable to the funding of religious
organizations. 4 As long as government money passes through the
hands of private individuals who themselves choose how to spend
that money from a set of options that does not encourage religious
choices, the arrangement will be constitutional. 5 With regard to
legislative accommodations for religion, the Court has made clear
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author would like to thank
the student editors at the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for putting together a
terrific symposium, and the participants at the symposium, particularly Tom Berg, for
extremely helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. The author also thanks Greg
Dekermenjian for his excellent research assistance.
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist took the judicial oath to become the Chief Justice on
September 26, 1986; he had previously served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
since January of 1972. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006). Chief Justice
Rehnquist passed away in September of 2005.
2. Those Clauses state that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997).
5. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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that legislatures have significant leeway to grant exemptions to
religious believers from general laws, subject only to a few important
limitations. 6 Most recently, in Locke v. Davey, 7 the Court granted
political decision-makers parallel authority to accommodate religious
non-belief by holding that the state of Washington could refuse to
fund theology majors from its general college scholarship program.
Finally, the Rehnquist Court was the first to apply the so-called
“endorsement test” to evaluate the constitutionality of governmentsponsored religious symbols and displays. The endorsement test was
developed by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 8 a 1984 case involving a Pawtucket, Rhode Island, display
of a crèche surrounded by various holiday “figures and decorations,”
and adopted by five Justices in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 9 a
1989 case involving two different holiday displays in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The test asks whether a “reasonable observer” would
feel that the government has sent “a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.” 10
Although the Supreme Court itself has applied the endorsement
test in only a handful of cases, the test has played an extremely
important role in how courts throughout the country have evaluated
government action. Lower federal courts and state courts have
applied the test in hundreds of cases 11 to evaluate the constitutionality
of many types of religious symbols and displays, from a Latin cross
erected on a city water tower, 12 to the “In God We Trust” inscribed
on U.S. currency, 13 to Mississippi’s state flag, 14 to Ohio’s state
6. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
7. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
8. 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
9. 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989).
10. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
11. See William M. Howard, Annotation, First Amendment Challenges to Display of
Religious Symbols on Public Property, 107 A.L.R.5TH (2003).
12. Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (disallowing
symbol).
13. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir.
2000) (disallowing display).
14. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio
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motto. 15 As such, the endorsement test is one of the Rehnquist
Court’s most important Religion Clause innovations.
Since its inception, the endorsement test has been the subject of
intense scholarly and judicial criticism. Commentators have argued,
for example, that the test lacks historical support, threatens the
dignity of the federal courts, and contradicts the Court’s own
accommodation jurisprudence. 16 Three other critiques, however, are
perhaps of greatest importance. The first contends that the test
inappropriately elevates symbolic harm or mere offense to
constitutionally cognizable injury. The second argues, on a variety of
specific grounds, that the test is incoherent and incapable of
consistent application. The third critique suggests that the test favors
majority religious traditions over minority ones, because the judges
who must decide whether a symbol or display sends a forbidden
message are themselves generally adherents of a majority tradition. 17
The thesis of this Article is two-fold. First, it argues that the
majority bias critique is the most persuasive criticism of the
endorsement test, followed (at some distance) by the contention that
application of the test compromises the dignity of the federal courts.
What unites these two critiques is that they focus not on the content
of the endorsement test itself, but rather on the identity of the
decision-maker applying the test. The Article also proposes a possible
radical solution to these two critiques by suggesting that Congress
could create an Article I court staffed by experts in a wide range of
majority and minority religious traditions. This court would decide
endorsement challenges to religious symbols or displays, subject only
to discretionary (but full) Supreme Court review. As this Article
notes, creation of such a tribunal would raise a variety of difficult
constitutional (and other) issues, but such a proposal would,
nonetheless, be worthy of Congress’ serious consideration.
The Article proceeds in two main parts. Part II briefly introduces
the endorsement test and its primary critiques. It then evaluates those
1998) (upholding the motto: “With God, All Things are Possible”).
15. Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding use of the St.
Andrew’s Cross on a flag).
16. See infra notes 53–79 and accompanying text.
17. For discussion of these three critiques, see infra notes 53–79 and accompanying text.
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critiques and argues that the majority bias critique is the most
persuasive criticism of the endorsement test. Part III proposes a draft
statute that would establish an Article I “Endorsement Court” to
decide endorsement challenges to government-sponsored religious
symbols and displays. It then discusses the potential constitutional
issues raised by the statute and argues that the advantages of such a
statute would outweigh its disadvantages.
II. THE ENDORSEMENT COURT, ARTICLE III STYLE
A. The Supreme Court
The holiday display challenged in the Lynch litigation involved, in
the words of the Supreme Court:
[M]any of the figures and decorations traditionally associated
with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus
house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a
Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such
characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds
of colored lights, a large banner that reads “SEASONS
GREETINGS,” and the crèche . . . which . . . consists of the
traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and
Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals. 18
When the First Circuit struck down this display, 19 it did so on the
grounds that the religious display favored Christianity over other
religions, and thus deserved strict scrutiny review under the Court’s
decision in Larson v. Valente, 20 which invalidated a statute that
“denied an exemption from certain registration and reporting
requirements to religious organizations receiving more than half of
their total contributions from non-members.” 21 Because the town’s
display lacked any legitimate secular purpose, the First Circuit held
that it failed Larson’s strict scrutiny standard. 22 The First Circuit’s
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
Donnelly, 691 F.2d at 1034 (citing Larson, 456 U.S. 228).
Id. at 1035.
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analysis is particularly interesting because it illuminates the fact that
prior to the Supreme Court’s creation and adoption of the
endorsement test, courts did not analyze cases involving the
government display of religious symbols differently from any other
case involving alleged state promotion or advancement of religion.
In Lynch, the Supreme Court did not announce any new standard
to evaluate religious displays. Chief Justice Burger’s majority
opinion upholding the display simply noted that it did not have the
primary effect of advancing religion. 23 However, Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence planted the seeds for a new standard. 24 Justice O’Connor
attempted to “clarif[y] [the Court’s] Establishment Clause doctrine” 25
by explaining that the government can violate the clause through
either “excessive entanglement with religious institutions” 26 or
“government endorsement or disapproval of religion.” 27 According to
O’Connor, the government may neither act with the purpose of
endorsing religion, nor convey a message of endorsement, even in the
absence of an actual intention to endorse. 28 With respect to the latter
problem, O’Connor wrote: “What is crucial is that a government
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only
practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community.” 29 Pawtucket’s holiday display had neither
the forbidden purpose nor effect, according to Justice O’Connor, both
because it was intended as a “[c]elebration of public holidays, which
have cultural significance” (purpose) 30 and because “the overall
holiday setting” of the included crèche “negate[d] any message of
endorsement” of the display’s religious content (effect). 31
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682–84.
Id. at 687–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 687–88.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 692.
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Five Justices adopted the endorsement test as law in 1989, three
years after Justice Rehnquist was confirmed as Chief Justice. In the
Allegheny case, the Court reviewed two different Pittsburgh holiday
displays: a crèche sitting alone on the Grand Staircase of a county
courthouse, and an eighteen-foot menorah placed next to a forty-fivefoot Christmas tree and a sign reading “Salute to Liberty.” 32 The
Court struck down the crèche display, 33 but upheld the other
display, 34 in a convoluted series of opinions that disagreed on, among
other things, whether the meaning of the larger (but more secular)
tree should be understood in light of the meaning of the smaller (but
clearly religious) menorah, or vice versa. 35
Although determining the precise holding of Allegheny is a
difficult exercise requiring patience, attention to detail, and perhaps a
pencil and notepad to record which Justice voted how and on what
issue, 36 it is clear that five Justices believed that the endorsement test
was the proper test for evaluating the constitutionality of the displays.
For example, in his opinion for the Court invalidating the crèche
display, Justice Blackmun concluded that “by prohibiting government
endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits precisely
what occurred here: the government’s lending its support to the
32. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–82 (1989).
33. Id. at 579.
34. Id.
35. Compare id. at 617 (“The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the
preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season serves to emphasize the secular
component of the message communicated by other elements of an accompanying holiday
display, including the Chanukah menorah.”), with id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Even though the tree alone may be deemed predominantly secular, it can
hardly be so characterized when placed next to such a forthrightly religious symbol [as the
menorah]. . . There can be no doubt that, when found in such company, the tree serves as an
unabashedly religious symbol.”).
36. Just as one example of how convoluted this set of opinions is, consider the
introduction to Justice Blackmun’s lead opinion:
JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III–A, IV, and V, an opinion with respect to
Parts I and II, in which JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O’CONNOR join, an
opinion with respect to Part III–B, in which JUSTICE STEVENS joins, an opinion
with respect to Part VII, in which JUSTICE O’CONNOR joins, and an opinion with
respect to Part VI.
Id. at 578.
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communication of a religious organization’s religious message.” 37
Elsewhere in the same opinion, he wrote:
In sum, Lynch teaches that government may celebrate
Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that
endorses Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny County has
transgressed this line. It has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a
way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian
message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ. 38
The various opinions in Allegheny provide additional details
regarding the nature of the endorsement test. Specifically, they make
clear that the entire context of the challenged display, particularly its
historical context, is important for evaluating the display’s
constitutionality. For example, describing Justice O’Connor’s opinion
in Lynch, Justice Blackmun noted that the endorsement “inquiry, of
necessity, turns upon the context in which the contested object
appears.” 39 Justice O’Connor, for her part, elaborated on her Lynch
test by noting that “the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to
the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged
practice and, like any test that is sensitive to context, it may not
always yield results with unanimous agreement at the margins,” 40 and
by explaining that “the ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant
because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a
message of endorsement of religion.” 41
The Court has applied or invoked the endorsement test in a
handful of cases since it decided Allegheny, 42 most notably in Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 43 in which it held that
the state of Ohio had not violated the Establishment Clause by
allowing the Ku Klux Klan to display a cross on the grounds of the
state capitol. The deciding opinion was penned by Justice O’Connor,
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 629 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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who found “no realistic danger that the community would think that
the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed . . . by
granting respondents a permit to erect their temporary cross on
Capitol Square.” 44 Justice O’Connor went on to explain that the
relevant perspective for endorsement purposes is not the “actual
perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing
degrees of knowledge,” 45 but rather “the reasonable observer . . .
[who] must be deemed aware of the history and context of the
community and forum in which the religious display appears.” 46
Justice O’Connor believed that such a reasonable observer would not
have viewed Ohio’s actions as endorsing Christianity because he or
she would have observed “the Klan’s cross display fully aware that
Capitol Square is a public space in which a multiplicity of groups,
both secular and religious, engage in expressive conduct.” 47
Most recently, the Court, in its final term led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, appeared to use the endorsement test, at least in part, to
invalidate Ten Commandments displays in two Kentucky
courthouses. 48 In finding that the history of the displays—in
particular, the fact that they were erected only after a court
invalidated two previous displays that were manifestly religious 49—
evidenced an improper religious purpose, the Court employed
endorsement language and quoted central passages from Lynch,
Allegheny, and Capitol Square. 50 Among others, the Court made
numerous references to the “reasonable observer,” suggesting at one
point that “[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the
Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier
displays.” 51
44. Id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 782 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
48. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
49. Id. at 2740–41.
50. See id. at 2733, 2737, 2738.
51. Id. at 2740. In the companion case to McCreary, the Court upheld a longstanding Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas Capitol. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125
U.S. 2854 (2005). The deciding vote in that case was issued by Justice Breyer, whose opinion
casts some doubt on the continuing validity of the endorsement test; Justice Breyer himself did
not invoke the test, instead stating that he “see[s] no test-related substitute for the exercise of
legal judgment.” Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Of course, with Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the Endorsement
Court may soon disappear, depending on whether her replacement
finds the test persuasive. 52 As a result, this is a particularly opportune
time to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the endorsement test
and whether Congress should consider taking steps to indicate its
approval of the test.
B. Endorsement Test Critiques
Judges and scholars have subjected the endorsement test to
withering critiques since its inception. The following summarizes
some of the more important criticisms of the test. The discussion is
not comprehensive, but simply introduces these critiques to provide a
background for the Article’s later arguments.
First, some have argued that the endorsement test finds no support
in early American thought regarding the proper relationship between
church and state. Michael McConnell is perhaps the most notable
proponent of this view, though he does not press the point
particularly strongly in his critique of the endorsement test. 53 Pointing
to the First Congress’ thanksgiving resolution, among other things,
McConnell argues that “[t]he early practice in the Republic was
replete with governmental proclamations and other actions that
endorsed religion in noncoercive ways,” 54 and that “[t]he generation
that adopted the First Amendment viewed some form of
governmental compulsion as the essence of an establishment of
religion.” 55 Under this view, a government sponsored crèche, for
instance, could not be considered an establishment of religion
because it coerces nobody, and because the framing generation
believed that some sort of actual coercion was a sine qua non of an
establishment violation. Of course, this view rests on the implicit
52. See Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135.
53. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 154 (1992) (noting that he “will not elaborate the point here”).
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id. at 154–55; see also Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”:
Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 957 (1989) (noting that the
endorsement test is “lacking in historical and textual support”).
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assumption that current constitutional doctrine must be consistent
with the framing generation’s original intent.
Second, some have argued that the endorsement test is
inconsistent with the Court’s accommodation doctrine. The
accommodation doctrine allows political decision-makers to exempt
religious believers from generally applicable legal requirements, so
long as the exemption alleviates a governmentally imposed burden on
the believer’s free exercise of religion, does not overly burden nonbeneficiaries, and is administered neutrally among different religious
traditions. 56 According to these critics, any legislative
accommodation or exemption from a generally applicable law
necessarily endorses religion. Again, McConnell argues that the test
casts suspicion on government actions that convey a message
that religion is worthy of particular protection—as any
accommodation of religion necessarily does . . . [t]here is no
way to distinguish between government action that treats a
religious belief as worthy of protection, and government action
that treats a religious belief as intrinsically valuable. 57
Likewise, Jesse Choper suggests that “[w]hen the state exempts a
minority religion from a generally applicable prohibition, such as
permitting members of Native American religious groups to use
peyote as part of their rituals, this . . . may reasonably be viewed as
government endorsement of religion.” 58 Choper even goes so far as to
argue that including religious groups in a broad category of both
religious and non-religious beneficiaries of government funding or
other benefits—a practice clearly appropriate under Supreme Court
doctrine (and perhaps required in some instances)—is also an
endorsement of religion. 59 Under this analysis, the endorsement test
is flawed because it is patently inconsistent with another important
aspect of the Court’s Religion Clause doctrine.
56. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
57. McConnell, supra note 53, at 151.
58. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL’Y
499, 532 (2002).
59. Id. at 531.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/11

2006]

The Endorsement Court

273

Third, some have criticized the endorsement test for involving the
federal courts in what can only be described as a ridiculous
enterprise. For example, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
once famously suggested that the test “requir[ed] scrutiny more
commonly associated with interior decorators than with the
judiciary.” 60 He further observed that “[i]t is discomfiting to think
that our fundamental charter of government distinguishes between
painted and white figures—a subject the parties have debated,” 61 and
that “[i]t would be appalling to conduct litigation under the
Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with . . .
witnesses testifying that they were offended—but would have been
less so were the crèche five feet closer to the jumbo candy cane.” 62
Justice Kennedy echoed these sentiments in Allegheny when he
claimed that the test “threatens to trivialize constitutional
adjudication.” 63 To illustrate his point, Kennedy mocked Justice
Blackmun’s application of the test to the crèche on the county
courthouse staircase. He noted:
JUSTICE BLACKMUN embraces a jurisprudence of minutiae. A
reviewing court must consider whether the city has included
Santas, talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other secular
symbols as “a center of attention separate from the crèche.”
After determining whether these centers of attention are
sufficiently “separate” that each “had their specific visual story
to tell,” the court must then measure their proximity to the
crèche. A community that wishes to construct a constitutional
display must also take care to avoid floral frames or other
devices that might insulate the crèche from the sanitizing effect
of the secular portions of the display. The majority also notes
the presence of evergreens near the crèche that are identical to
60. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 130.
63. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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two small evergreens placed near official county signs. After
today’s decision, municipal greenery must be used with care. 64
Although these critiques may appear to be mere rhetorical
flourishes intended to ridicule a test flawed on other grounds, I
believe they represent an important independent criticism. They
suggest that the test, whatever its other flaws, is undesirable because
it is beneath the federal courts’ dignity to concern themselves with
such “marginialia” as the placement and appearance of objects. 65
Although the critics do not make the point explicitly, inherent in their
ridicule appears the suggestion that continued application of such an
absurd and undignified test will bring disrepute on the courts and
undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
A fourth critique contends that the endorsement test wrongly
elevates mere offense, alienation, or symbolic harm to judicially
redressable injury. As Jessie Hill recently put it, this
line of criticism takes issue with the notion that courts should
be asking the endorsement question at all, arguing that the
symbolic injury on which the endorsement test is centered
should not constitute constitutionally cognizable injury, or that
the injury involved—the injury to individuals’ sensibilities—is
too subjective to produce a meaningful and predictable
jurisprudence. 66
This harm-focused critique has taken several forms. For example,
Stephen Smith has argued that the alienation that the endorsement
test seeks to alleviate is unavoidable in our religiously diverse
society; any government action, including the articulation and
application of the endorsement test itself, will inevitably alienate
somebody’s religious beliefs. 67 Thus, the test, according to Smith, is
64. Id. at 674–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted and emphasis added).
65. Id. at 676.
66. B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 507 (2005).
67. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 309–12 (1987). Smith also
disputes Justice O’Connor’s purported link between endorsement and the political status of
non-adherents. See id.
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“simply unworkable.” 68 Jesse Choper, for his part, finds the redress
of mere “distressed sensibilities” 69 inconsistent with principles of
federal court review, arguing that such redress “run[s] counter to the
general precept that the awesome power of judicial review should not
readily be invoked to remedy harm no greater than ‘indignation,’
‘offense,’ or the ‘psychological consequence presumably produced
by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.’” 70 Bill
Marshall, although defending the endorsement test on other
grounds, 71 argues that the test must be understood to protect against
more than offensive government conduct to prevent inconsistency
with the Court’s free speech jurisprudence. 72
Fifth, many have argued that the endorsement test is inherently
incoherent and incapable of consistent application. Again, there are
many variations on this general critique. McConnell, for example,
argues that the test is nothing more than a Religion Clause version of
the “I know it when I see it” principle because “[w]hether a particular
governmental action appears to endorse or disapprove religion
depends on the presuppositions of the observer, and there is no
‘neutral’ position, outside the culture, from which to make this
assessment.” 73 Choper finds fault with the notion of the “reasonable
observer” as well, arguing that it is difficult to know “whose
perceptions ought to count,” as well as what “level of knowledge
[should be] attributable to the reasonable observer.” 74 Smith contends
that the concept of “endorsement” itself is ambiguous and likely
68. Id. at 305–12.
69. Choper, supra note 58, at 521.
70. Id. at 530 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 510 (“I do not believe that mere feelings
of offense should rise to the level of a judicially redressable harm under the Establishment
Clause, absent any real threat to religious liberty.”).
71. See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It:” The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986) (“I will argue that despite its problem of
inherent subjectivity, a symbolic understanding of establishment may appropriately provide a
cohesive framework under which establishment jurisprudence may be remodeled.”).
72. See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 353 (1991) (“I conclude that the infusion of an
offensiveness component into religion clause jurisprudence is inappropriate and should be
eliminated.”).
73. McConnell, supra note 53, at 148.
74. Choper, supra note 58, at 511.
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impossible to clarify. 75 Most recently, Jessie Hill has invoked socalled “speech act theory” to criticize the concept of “context” in the
endorsement test. Specifically, she argues that “the indeterminacy
and unpredictability in the application of the endorsement test are . . .
inherent in the problem of attempting to determine the social meaning
of symbolic government action against the backdrop of extreme
viewpoint plurality, without the potentially stabilizing element of
subjective intent to guide the inquiry.” 76 Although all of these
versions of the critique focus on somewhat different problems, they
all suggest that the endorsement test is inherently amorphous and
indeterminate, and therefore impossible for lower courts to apply in
anything but an inconsistent ad hoc manner.
Finally, a number of scholars have argued that the endorsement
test is inherently biased in favor of majority religious traditions. Once
again, Jessie Hill puts it well by noting that the
societal power structure . . . makes the religious symbols and
practices of dominant groups seem natural, and therefore
dictates that the speech act of endorsement is only successful
when it appears to exceed what it considered a ‘normal’
amount of government approval . . . [which] is likely to be
greater with respect to majority, mainstream religions, whose
practice and culture are more closely tied to the history and
culture of the United States. 77
McConnell echoes this view, arguing that “[m]essages affirming
mainstream religion . . . are likely to be familiar and to seem
inconsequential. As Justice O’Connor has interpreted her approach, if
a practice is ‘longstanding’ . . ., it is unlikely to ‘convey a message of
endorsement. . . . In our culture, most ‘longstanding’ symbols are
those associated with Protestant Christianity.” 78 Other commentators,
including Steven Gey and Larry Tribe, have criticized the
75. Smith, supra note 67, at 276–83. Smith also critiques the “objective observer”
concept, among others. See id. at 292–95.
76. Hill, supra note 66, at 494.
77. Id. at 521; see also id. (“By refusing to take into account the differences between
majority and minority religions, the Court’s endorsement test analysis threatens simply to
reproduce unconsciously the majority perspective and to reinforce majority religious power.”).
78. McConnell, supra note 53, at 154.
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endorsement test on similar grounds. 79 This critique focuses in part
on the formulation of the endorsement test, particularly its attempt to
exclude “ubiquitous” acknowledgements of religion from
invalidation, but it also focuses on the nature of the decision-maker
applying the test. As will be discussed below, the problem of
majority bias is far greater when the decision-makers themselves are
members of a majority tradition and are, therefore, much less likely
to view a symbol of that majority tradition as anything more than a
harmless acknowledgement of a long-standing cultural belief.
C. Assessing the Critiques
This section explains why the majority-bias critique of the
endorsement test is the most compelling of the critiques discussed
above. In my view, the main problem with the endorsement test is not
the content of the test itself, which generally asks the correct question
about the constitutional propriety of religious symbols and displays, 80
but rather the nature of the tribunal that must apply the test in
particular cases.
In my view, the originalist critique of the endorsement test carries
little weight. McConnell’s suggestion that non-coercive
endorsements were common in the early republic may well be correct
given the Free Exercise Clause’s prohibition on religious coercion, 81
but the notion that the Establishment Clause protects only against
compulsion runs into the persuasive and well-known
79. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1988);
Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463,
481 (1994) (“By employing an ‘objective observer’ to decide questions of endorsement, Justice
O'Connor relays the message to religious minorities that their perceptions are wrong; or, even
worse, that their perceptions do not matter.”).
80. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious
Equality: Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32
MCGEORGE L. REV. 837, 851 (2001) (“The issue of endorsement seems particularly germane to
cases involving government displays of religious symbols.”); Hill, supra note 66, at 495 (noting
that in cases dealing with religious displays, “the endorsement test’s focus on the symbolic or
‘expressive’ harm caused by religious symbols is entirely appropriate”); Marshall, supra note
72, at 355 (noting that the endorsement test is “supported by sound considerations”); id. at 355
n.23 (summarizing the “virtues of the endorsement inquiry”); Shari Seidman Diamond &
Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 715 (2001) (arguing that the
“prohibition of endorsement is an indispensable element of the Establishment Clause”).
81. See McConnell, supra note 53, at 155.
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counterargument that such an interpretation renders the clause
redundant. 82 Moreover, the fact that governmental proclamations of
religion that did not “favor[] one sect over another” 83 were prevalent
during the founding era does not necessarily suggest that the framers
believed that endorsement of a particular tradition or sect, as a crèche
display arguably does, would also be constitutionally appropriate.
More to the point, however, the historical argument rests on a
controversial assumption regarding the relationship between original
understanding and contemporary interpretation that I do not share.
This is not an appropriate forum for hashing out the arguments in
favor of and against originalism as an interpretive method. 84 It may
be true that if one subscribes to this method, the endorsement test (at
least as currently framed) would likely not survive. However, it is
worth noting that the endorsement test would not be the only victim
of an originalist re-reading of the Establishment Clause; indeed, it is
possible that the entire doctrine would require scrapping. 85 An
originalist reading of the Establishment Clause seems particularly
inappropriate given the vast increase in religious diversity in the
United States over the past two hundred years, the history of religious
persecution and violence in America and elsewhere during that
period, and the growth of secularism as a significant intellectual
force. These developments have resulted in a church-state milieu far
different from the one in which the framers lived in ways that
rightfully affect how we should understand the clause, at least under a
pragmatic view of constitutional interpretation. 86
82. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 205 (1992) (“But the Establishment Clause cannot be mere surplusage. If the Free Exercise
Clause standing alone guarantees free exercise of non-religion, the Establishment Clause must
do more than bar coercion of non-believers. Thus a “coercion” test for establishment would
reduce the Establishment Clause to a redundancy.”).
83. McConnell, supra note 53, at 155.
84. For arguments in favor of originalism, see, for example, ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). For critiques of
originalism, see, for example, RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
85. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727-33 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing on originalist grounds that the Establishment Clause only prohibits Congress from
interfering with a state establishment of religion).
86. For examples of pragmatic constitutional theory, see, for example, Stephen Breyer,
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The criticism that the endorsement test is inconsistent with the
Court’s accommodation doctrine is also not particularly persuasive.
The Court allows legislatures to accommodate religious beliefs by
granting exemptions from generally applicable laws if they are
burdensome to religion, so long as the exemption is applied evenhandedly among different faiths and is not overly burdensome to nonbeneficiaries. 87 When a legislature accommodates religion in such a
way—for example, by allowing Native Americans to ingest peyote as
part of a religious ceremony—it does not endorse the “truthfulness
and value” of the religion, 88 but rather simply recognizes that, for
many people, religious belief is an important basis for thought and
behavior that deserves respect. Even if this distinction is not crystal
clear to everyone, nothing prevents the Court from simply
announcing (as it basically has) that accommodations otherwise
meeting constitutional requirements will not be considered
endorsements.
In his critique, Smith argues that such a carve out for legislative
accommodations is incoherent because it rests on distinguishing
between legislators acting “because they believe in religion (in which
case the measure would probably be considered an invalid
endorsement), or because they believe their constituents believe in
religion (in which case the measure would be a permissible
accommodation).” 89 According to Smith, the distinction makes no
sense, both because legislators are themselves citizens and because
legislators represent their constituents by acting on their own
beliefs. 90 I agree that such a distinction is flawed (among other
things, legislators do not generally have only one intention in passing
a law), but I do not believe that this distinction animates the
accommodation carve-out. Contrary to Smith’s assumption, under
current doctrine, a court will not find an accommodation to be an
endorsement even if the legislators enacting it do so because they
believe that religion is “true or beneficial,” so long as the record does
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2002); Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
87. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
88. Smith, supra note 67, at 279.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 280.
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not indicate that they enacted the accommodation only because they
think religion is true or beneficial. In a typical case, because
accommodations do in fact relieve significant burdens on important
beliefs, it is plausible for the Court to assume, as it does, that at least
a good part of the reason for granting an accommodation was that
religion is an important source of value and action that deserves
respect, even if the legislators also happen to think that religion is
true or beneficial. 91 It is also plausible for the Court to assume that
this is the message that an accommodation actually sends to
reasonable objective observers, in the absence of clear evidence
demonstrating that the legislators intended to send or in fact did send
the message that religion is true or beneficial.
In any event, the fact that an accommodation carve out has led
some observers (those who think that accommodation and
endorsement are indistinguishable) to believe that the doctrine is
somewhat incoherent at the margins hardly counts as a devastating
critique of a doctrine trying to make sense of such an intractable area
of constitutional law. 92 This is particularly true in light of the fact
that, in the sixteen years since the Court adopted the endorsement
test, the purported inconsistency between the accommodation and
endorsement doctrines has posed no particular problems in the
application of either endorsement or accommodation law.
The argument that the endorsement test wrongly elevates claims
of mere offense or symbolic injury to cognizable federal rights is also
not decisive. To begin with, even those who object to the
endorsement test on this ground generally concede that remedying
symbolic harm is not beyond the power of the judicial branch. For
example, Choper, in explaining that symbolic injury is sufficient to
satisfy Article III’s “concrete injury” requirement under the Court’s
standing jurisprudence, acknowledges that “constitutional decisions
have invalidated laws solely because of their expressive harm, i.e.,
their communication of ‘negative or inappropriate attitudes’ toward
91. The evenhandedness requirement protects against legislators acting because they think
that a particular religion is true or beneficial, or even more deserving of respect than others.
92. See Marshall, supra note 71, at 498 (“[T]here is a substantial argument to be made
that the difficulty in achieving an intelligible establishment clause doctrine rests primarily with
the issue itself and only to a lesser extent with the Court’s deficiencies.”).
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persons or groups, and have approved nominal damages to remedy
constitutional violations where actual injury cannot be shown.” 93
Thus, recognizing symbolic injury under the Establishment Clause
does not create a constitutional anomaly or require courts to engage
in a completely unfamiliar inquiry.
Moreover, the recognition and redress of symbolic injuries caused
by improper church-state relations finds strong support in a growing
field of legal scholarship focusing on the harms caused by various
types of government expression. 94 This so-called “expressivist
school” of legal thought contends that “what a law expresses may
render it unconstitutional, regardless whether any of its tangible or
material effects are constitutionally troubling.” 95 Of course,
expressivism has been on the receiving end of blistering critiques as
well, 96 and a full defense of the endorsement test must wrestle with
these criticisms to be complete. I will not engage in such a wrestling
match here, but simply note that an approach to the Establishment
Clause focusing on the symbolic dimension of government conduct is
particularly compelling because the recent increase in national
religious diversity has caused government-sponsored religious
messages to become more problematic than ever before, 97 and
because focusing on the perceptions of both non-believers and
believers directly serves several of the Establishment Clause’s basic
purposes, including promoting civil peace, respecting individual
conscience, and protecting religion from the deleterious effects of
state support. 98
93. Choper, supra note 58, at 529–30 (quoting Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1527
(2000)).
94. See generally Anderson & Pildes, supra note 93.
95. Hill, supra note 66, at 510.
96. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe,
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 773
(2001) (“This appraisal of comparative trends, moreover, is not limited to the legal landscape;
within the political culture as well, the center of gravity of Establishment Clause controversy
has shifted away from issues involving government money and toward issues of government
religious messages.”).
98. For an excellent argument on this point, see Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 80, at
727–32.
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The argument that the endorsement test is indeterminate, provides
little guidance for lower courts, and will inevitably result in
inconsistent decisions is a strong critique. However, this claim is
hardly unique among analytical frameworks in constitutional law, 99
which is filled with such “know it when we see it” tests. To take just
a few examples from administrative law, 100 the endorsement test is
not really any less determinate than the following:
• The Morrison v. Olson 101 test for deciding whether a
removal restriction on an executive branch officer is
unconstitutional because it “impede[s] the President’s
ability to perform his constitutional duty.” 102
• The Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 103
test for determining whether Congress can assign a nonArticle III court adjudicatory powers, which considers,
among other factors, “the extent to which the ‘essential
attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III
courts.” 104
• The Mathews v. Eldridge 105 test for determining whether
the government has provided sufficient process for
withdrawing a legally protected property interest, requiring
courts to consider the strength of the government interest,
the strength of the private interest, and the risk that not
providing additional process will result in an erroneous
deprivation. 106
Obviously, these examples could be multiplied with the
consideration of tests employed in other fields of constitutional law.
To provide one more example, consider the “intermediate scrutiny”
test that the Court has applied to content-neutral speech restrictions,
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 847–51.
Administrative law is a class that I happen to teach from time to time.
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 691.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Id. at 851.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
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restrictions on commercial speech, and laws discriminating on the
basis of gender, among others. 107 This standard of scrutiny asks
whether the government’s interest in enacting the law is sufficiently
“important” and whether the means chosen are substantially related
to the law’s objective. 108 Like the endorsement test, the intermediate
scrutiny standard has been roundly criticized as indeterminate and
resulting in ad hoc judicial decision-making, 109 but it has been far
from unworkable in practice and, in fact, has much support for its
recommendation. 110
The endorsement test, like these other tests, is an example of
judicial minimalism, in the sense that it necessarily results in very
narrow decisions that turn on the specific details and characteristics
of the particular case being adjudicated. 111 Because they are
minimalistic, these tests will inevitably give little guidance to lower
courts and may result in inconsistent decisions. 112 These are some of
the costs of minimalism, and they apply to the endorsement test just
as they do to other minimalistic tests, but there are benefits to
minimalism as well. 113 One of these benefits is that by employing
judicial minimalism, the Court can take its time with particularly
difficult issues (such as the proper limits of church-state interaction)
and allow the state of the law to evolve as the Court learns more
about the particular circumstances giving rise to these complicated
controversies. 114 As the Court decides more cases, it is hoped that,
over time, the doctrine will become clearer and more focused, until
the series of decisions creates a body of jurisprudence that provides
predictability and adequate guidance. The Court has admittedly not
107. For a comprehensive discussion of the intermediate standard, see generally Jay D.
Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998).
108. See id. at 317–18.
109. See id. at 301 (collecting critiques).
110. See id. at 325–39 (arguing in favor of the intermediate scrutiny standard).
111. On minimalism generally, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
112. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28–29 (1996).
113. See id. at 7–8.
114. See Wexler, supra note 107, at 314–15, 330–39.
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yet reached this goal with regards to the endorsement test, but this in
itself is not a critique of any particular minimalist doctrine.
One could argue that the endorsement test differs from other
minimalistic constitutional tests in that, by relying on the concept of
the reasonable observer who views a display in its entire context, it
adds a level of uncertainty and incoherence not present with the other
tests. It is true that the reasonable observer concept is subject to the
criticism that it is independently indeterminate (who is this observer;
what are his or her characteristics?). 115 Further, Jessie Hill is certainly
correct to suggest that the contextual nature of the endorsement test
exacerbates its indeterminacy; as she notes, both the physical and
historical context of any display can be understood in myriad ways
depending on one’s perspective. 116
I doubt, however, that these features of the endorsement test
meaningfully differentiate it from other indeterminate constitutional
tests. All such tests involve terms or concepts, such as “reasonable
observer” or “historical context,” that are not self-defining and
require further elaboration from higher courts to be applied with any
consistency. For instance, without further guidance, how should a
lower court determine whether an adjudicatory body has exercised an
“essential attribute” of federal judicial power, whether the private
interest in a protected property interest is high, low, or somewhere in
between, whether a government objective is “important” enough to
pass constitutional muster, or whether a Congressional restriction on
Presidential power has impeded the President’s ability to carry out his
constitutional duties? For each of these inquiries, lower courts must
simply struggle through cases, using their own powers of logic and
judgment, until higher courts instruct them to do something different.
The same is true of the endorsement test. Is the “reasonable observer
a member of one of the regnant faiths, a minority adherent, or an
atheist?” 117 We do not know until the Supreme Court tells us, but
there is nothing inherent in the concept of the “reasonable observer”
that would prevent the Court from further specifying what it means.
115. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
116. See Hill, supra note 66, at 522–27.
117. Choper, supra note 58, at 511.
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The same is true with regard to context. Should a lower court
consider a display’s border to be part of the display or the
demarcation indicating the end of the display? 118 Simply saying that
lower courts should look at “physical context” does not answer the
question, of course, but nothing prevents the Supreme Court from
deciding what approach makes the most sense in most cases and
instructing lower courts to adopt that approach. Scholars and other
observers can then argue whether the Court made the right choice,
but that is a far different matter than saying that the Court’s test is
indeterminate and subjective.
These are the critiques of the endorsement test that are either
misplaced or overstated. On the other hand, the criticism, voiced by
McConnell, Hill, and others, 119 that the endorsement test improperly
favors majority religions over minority ones is compelling. This is a
substantive critique, rather than one focused on lack of predictability
or determinacy. It claims, at least in the version that I prefer, that: (1)
The endorsement test’s virtues include its support of certain values—
equality, protection of conscience, promoting civil peace 120—that
require judges to attend to the way in which minority religious
believers (and non-believers) perceive the meaning of religious
displays and symbols promoting majority traditions; 121 and (2) It is
very difficult for judges who are themselves not, for the most part,
members of minority traditions to understand those perceptions and
to empathize with them. 122 Of course, a majority bias in the
application of the endorsement test is not inevitable. Members of the
Court could recognize the inherent difficulties in understanding the
perceptions of people who are very different from themselves and
118. Hill, supra note 66, at 39.
119. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
121. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919, 980 (2004) (“Under a minority-protection approach, the non-endorsement test too should
emphasize the perspective of those in the minority faith.”). To be sure, Berg believes that “the
protection and equalization of minority faiths should not be the sole criterion for Religion
Clause cases,” id. at 922, but he does suggest that “the protection and equal status of minority
faiths and adherents is a significant purpose of religious freedom, even if not the sole or
conclusive one.” Id. at 923.
122. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 711–12 &
n.52 (1986).
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move to counteract these difficulties. For example, the Court could
establish a presumption against religious displays, 123 explicitly
indicate that courts should carefully consider the perspectives of
minority believers when deciding cases, or perhaps even invite
minority traditions to file amicus briefs with the Court. 124 However,
the Court has not taken any of these measures, and, as its recent
decision upholding the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas
Capitol grounds demonstrates, it does not explicitly consider minority
religious believers’ perceptions when deciding these cases. The
majority decision in Van Orden, for example, contains not a shred of
consideration of how, for example, a Hindu, a Buddhist, a
Zoroastrian, a Jew, or an atheist might perceive the monument in
question.
Although it does not rise to the importance of the majority-bias
critique, the argument that the endorsement test undermines the
dignity of the courts carries some weight as well. What law professor
has taught these cases without milking them for laughs? What if there
were two reindeer? What if the menorah was fifty feet high? What
about three reindeer? What if the menorah did a silly dance? The
jokes are too easy; they practically write themselves. Why is this? It
is difficult to make the same kind of jokes in any other area of law,
even in those areas, such as the ones discussed above, that are also
highly indeterminate. One could certainly criticize, for example, the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for requiring courts to
make similar subtle distinctions (Were the drugs in the bag? Was the
bag open? Was it in the trunk?), but the distinctions are hardly as
funny. Something about the nature of the displays—that they are
visual, perhaps, or that they often include sacred objects together with
everyday ones—makes the endorsement exercise uniquely ridiculous,
123. See Hill, supra note 66, at 539–44.
124. One example of such a brief (not explicitly invited by the Court, of course) was the
brief submitted in the Pledge of Allegiance case on behalf of various Buddhist organizations
and believers. This brief is discussed below, see infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
Another possibility, at least at the trial level, would be to ensure that expert witnesses testify as
to the perceived effects of the challenged symbol or display. As Professor Berg pointed out at
the symposium, such witnesses do, in fact, sometimes testify. But the introduction of such
testimony does not seem to have softened the majority bias problem with the endorsement test
at the appellate or Supreme Court levels, even if it might have some beneficial effects at the
trial level.
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even to those who (like me) support it as theoretically sound. Surely
it is a cause for serious concern when the courts routinely engage in a
task that is widely perceived as, for lack of a better way to put it,
downright goofy.
Interestingly, what both of these critiques of the endorsement test
share is a focus on the decision-maker who must apply the test, rather
than on the content of the test itself. This raises the question of
whether Congress could fashion an institutional arrangement that
would keep the endorsement test intact, but change the actors who
apply it. Such an arrangement would be possible and, perhaps,
desirable. This Article now turns to this topic.
III. THE ENDORSEMENT COURT, ARTICLE I STYLE
A. Article I Courts, Generally
Although Article III of the Constitution provides that the “judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish,” 125 and that the judges of these courts must enjoy both
salary and tenure protection, 126 Congress has long vested
adjudicatory power in tribunals staffed by decision-makers who enjoy
neither salary nor tenure protection. 127 Examples include not only the
prominent Tax 128 and Bankruptcy Courts 129 and the system of federal
magistrate judges responsible for much of the nation’s initial criminal
law work, 130 but also adjudicatory bodies of all sorts within the
various federal agencies. The Supreme Court has placed some limits
on Congress’ authority to grant jurisdiction to these tribunals, most
famously by striking down the Bankruptcy Courts as constituted in
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
126. See id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
127. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 217–18 (4th ed. 2003).
128. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2000) (establishing the Tax Court as an Article I court).
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (describing appointment of Bankruptcy Judges to fourteen year
terms, though they are also described as being “judicial officers” of the Article III district
courts).
130. See id. § 631 (providing for the appointment and tenure of magistrate judges).
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1982, 131 but for the most part it has tolerated these arrangements. For
instance, the Court has upheld the magistrate court system, on the
grounds that magistrates act “subsidiary to and only in aid of the
district court,” which maintains “total control and jurisdiction.” 132
The Court has also upheld arrangements allowing agency
adjudicatory bodies to determine various private claims between
individuals and organizations that are related to public regulatory
programs. 133 In Schor, the Court articulated the “test”—alluded to
above 134—governing whether jurisdiction in an Article I court or
agency is proper. It noted:
Thus, in reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a
number of factors, none of which has been deemed
determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned
role of the federal judiciary. Among the factors upon which we
have focused are the extent to which the “essential attributes of
judicial power” are reserved to Article III courts, and,
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the
right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress
to depart from the requirements of Article III. 135
Courts have held that Congress can vest non-Article III tribunals
with the power to decide constitutional questions, 136 although it is far
from clear whether such decisions must be reviewable by an Article
III court, and, if so, whether review by the Article III court must be
searching in nature.
131. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
132. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980).
133. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
134. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
135. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
136. See, e.g., Crawford v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 266 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2001);
Rager v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 775 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1985).
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B. A Proposed Statute
It is my contention that something like the following statute would
be worth Congress’ serious attention:
The Endorsement Courts Act of 2006
Sec. 1 Establishment. There shall hereby be established an
“Endorsement Court” to assist the federal Article III courts
with adjudication of claims that government symbols or
displays 137 unconstitutionally endorse religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Sec. 2 Jurisdiction. The Endorsement Court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any claim that any government symbol or
display unconstitutionally endorses religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Sec. 3 Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. No Federal District
Court or Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to hear any
claim that any government symbol unconstitutionally endorses
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States may
exercise de novo appellate review of any final decision of the
Endorsement Court at its discretion by writ of certiorari as
described in 28 U.S.C. 1254.
Sec. 4 Appointment of Endorsement Court Judges. The
Endorsement Court shall be staffed by seven Endorsement
Court Judges. Endorsement Court Judges shall be appointed by
the Supreme Court of the United States, pursuant to procedures
established by the Supreme Court.
The Endorsement Court shall consist of the following:
(a) One Judge with substantial knowledge of a Protestant
religious tradition.
137. Clearly this phrase, as well as other terms in the statute, would need to be defined, and
such definitions would surely be difficult to craft. This Article does not attempt any such
definitions, but assumes that a workable definition could be drafted.
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(b) One Judge with substantial knowledge of Catholicism.
(c) One Judge with substantial knowledge of Judaism.
(d) Two Judges with substantial knowledge of an Eastern
religious tradition, including Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, or
Confucianism.
(e) One Judge with substantial knowledge of a religious
tradition not represented in subsections (a)–(d).
(f) One Judge with substantial knowledge of atheism. 138
Sec. 5 Tenure of Endorsement Court Judges. Each
Endorsement Court Judge shall serve for a period of three
years, 139 unless removed prior to the end of the term by the
Supreme Court of the United States. The President of the
United States shall have the power to remove any member of
the Endorsement Court only in cases of malfeasance or
neglect. 140
Sec. 6 Salary of Endorsement Court Judges. The salary of
Endorsement Court Judges shall be [some reasonable amount].
138. As noted below, the mix of knowledge reflected in this section is by way of example
only; a different mix may be preferable, or perhaps the statute would work better simply by
requiring appointment of judges who reflect a broad knowledge about religion. Professor Berg
suggested at the symposium, quite persuasively, that dividing up the religious universe in the
way the draft statute does is only one way to split up that universe, and not necessarily the best
way. For example, Professor Berg is certainly correct to say that another quite relevant, perhaps
better, way to split up the religious universe would be to follow the insight of James Davison
Hunter, who roughly divides modern religious belief into progressive and orthodox visions.
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 107–31
(1991). As a theoretical matter, this may indeed be a better way to classify religious beliefs in
the modern world. As a practical matter, it would probably be much more difficult to write such
a classification into a statute such as this one. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the
statute calls for its members to have “substantial knowledge” of certain religious traditions, not
that they themselves are members of those traditions (a qualification which would be
constitutionally problematic for reasons discussed below). It seems to me that those who have
substantial knowledge of certain religious traditions would likely possess knowledge of
different varieties within those traditions, both orthodox and progressive, and could understand
how both orthodox and progressive members of those traditions would view a religious symbol
or display.
139. There is nothing particularly magical about three years; perhaps five or seven or some
other length would work better.
140. Perhaps the President should have no removal power at all.
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Sec. 7 Supervision of Endorsement Court Judges. Endorsement
Court Judges shall be subject to the supervision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, with respect to disciplinary action
and other relevant administrative matters.
Sec. 8 Procedures. Claims shall be presented to the
Endorsement Court, and the Endorsement Court shall hold a
hearing on those claims, pursuant to procedures established by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Those procedures
shall provide, at a minimum, for the written and oral
presentation of evidence and arguments to the Endorsement
Court by the party challenging the government symbol or
display and the party defending such symbol or display.
Sec. 9 Final Decision. The Endorsement Court shall, within a
reasonable time following a hearing, render a final written
decision and order regarding whether the challenged symbol or
display constitutes an endorsement of religion, as defined and
explained by the Supreme Court of the United States. One
Endorsement Court Judge shall write a majority decision
representing the views of the majority of the Endorsement
Court. Individual Endorsement Court Judges may contribute
additional concurring or dissenting opinions as warranted.
Congress urges individual Endorsement Court Judges to
provide written explanations of how the challenged symbols or
displays would affect the adherents of the religious traditions
with which they possess knowledge. Orders of the
Endorsement Court become final and enforceable upon
issuance.
Before I engage in an analysis of the desirability of such a statute,
several caveats are in order. First, I have drafted the statute in more
or less ordinary language, rather than making an effort to have the
proposal read like an actual statute. Thus, the statute may be less
precise than it should or would be if it were a real proposal. 141
141. For example, I have made no effort to define the words “symbol” or “display” (or
“religious” for that matter). Clearly, these words would have to be defined, and, just as clearly,
whatever definitions would ultimately be included in the statute would cause problems (and
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Second, although the intent of the statute is to decrease somewhat the
involvement of the federal courts with the endorsement test, and to
give much of that work to a non-Article III tribunal staffed by
individuals with knowledge of a range of religions, I absolutely am
not wedded to the specific arrangement put forth by the draft statute,
including the precise mix of religious knowledge referred to in
section four. It is but one example of the general notion I attempt to
advance; variations within the general scheme may prove to be
preferable either as a policy or constitutional matter, and I will
attempt to note these possible alternatives in my discussion. Finally, I
mean what I say in the sentence immediately prior to the draft statute:
My claim is not that such a statute would definitely be more desirable
than the current regime, but rather only that such a statute is worth
consideration and discussion, even if only as a way of thinking about
how federal judges should apply the endorsement test.
C. Constitutional Issues
This subsection identifies the various constitutional issues raised
by the draft statute and addresses them briefly, with the intention of
noting where the statute might be most vulnerable to attack and how
it might be tweaked to avoid these problems if necessary. 142 It is
worth noting at the outset that the Supreme Court has given little
guidance as to many of the issues raised by the statute, and therefore
there is ultimately no way to predict with any certainty whether any
particular part of the statute would be held unconstitutional. Indeed,
this may be an additional independent advantage of enacting such a
statute. Given that it would almost certainly be challenged, it could
result in new law clarifying Congress’ limits when it seeks to create
alternative institutional arrangements to vindicate federal rights. The
following subsections address the most important constitutional
issues potentially raised by the draft statute, namely whether the
jurisdictional provision violates Article III and whether the
litigation) at the margins. This problem, however, hardly distinguishes the draft statute from
any other statute.
142. The statute could even be written to address certain contingencies, such that if one
part of the statute is found unconstitutional, a different section remedying the constitutional
problem will take effect.
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appointment provision violates either the Appointment Clause of
Article II or the Religious Test Clause of Article VI. 143
1. Jurisdictional Provision
First, of course, there are potential constitutional problems with
the basic arrangement—that is, stripping the lower federal courts of
jurisdiction over the endorsement issue and vesting it with an Article
I court, subject only to discretionary, but full, Supreme Court review.
Taking the jurisdiction-stripping subissue first, no judicial or
scholarly consensus exists regarding Congress’ power to limit the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, except to the extent that it is
“untenable” to suggest “that lower federal courts created by Congress
must have the full judicial power described in Article III.” 144
Nonetheless, there is a good chance that the arrangement put forth by
the draft statute would be held constitutional. First, it finds support in
Articles III’s text, which gives Congress discretion to create lower
federal courts in the first place. 145 Based on this text, some have
advanced the persuasive argument that Congress’ power to refuse to
create lower federal courts implies the lesser power to restrict the
jurisdiction of those courts once they have been created. 146 If this is
true, the basic arrangement of the draft statute would certainly be
constitutional.
Even under theories suggesting limits on Congress’ power to
restrict the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, certain features of the
proposed statute weigh heavily in favor of its constitutionality. First,
143. Of course, these are not the only potential constitutional issues raised by the draft
statute. For example, the statute could be subject to attack on Establishment Clause grounds
because of its specific mandate to include religious knowledge as a prerequisite for the exercise
of governmental authority, or for requiring too precise a mix of religious knowledge on the
Endorsement Court. The statute may also raise separation of powers problems as well, for
example through the requirement that the Supreme Court develop procedures for the
Endorsement Court to follow.
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 191; see also id. at 192 (noting that “this theory . . .
has not been followed at any point in American history”).
145. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”) (emphasis added).
146. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 192–96, 192 n.3 (discussing this argument and
citing authorities).
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the statute does nothing to affect state court jurisdiction over
endorsement claims, which Congress has no power to affect. The
Supreme Court would continue to have full jurisdiction to review
judgments of the highest state court that are based on the First
Amendment. Second, under the statute, the Supreme Court has full, if
discretionary, jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Endorsement
Court, so that the statute does not cut off all federal court
consideration of the endorsement issue. Finally, although the
Endorsement Court is not an Article III court, it is substantially
controlled by one with respect to both the appointment and removal
of its members and disciplinary and administrative matters. These
provisions ensure that an Article III tribunal remains a very vital
component in the enforcement of the non-endorsement right.
An examination of some of the more prominent arguments for
limiting Congress’ power to restrict lower federal court jurisdiction
demonstrates the strengths of the draft statute. 147 For example, Justice
Story once advanced the famous theory, based on the “shall be
vested” language of Article III, 148 that some federal court review of
all federal claims must be available, and therefore that, in cases in
which state court review of a federal claim is unavailable, there must
be some lower federal court to hear the claim or else no federal court
will be able to do so (because Congress cannot expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 149). 150 This theory, however, does
not threaten the draft statute, both because state court review of
endorsement claims remains available and because the statute
provides for review by the Supreme Court of the Endorsement
Court’s decisions.
Professor Eisenberg’s theory, which rests in large part on the
difficulty of Supreme Court superintendence over federal law in an
147. Of course, the Court has required Congress to indicate with extreme clarity its intent
to bar review of constitutional claims before recognizing such limits. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). The draft statute is worded
with the intent to be extremely clear regarding preclusion of lower federal court review of
endorsement claims for this reason.
148. See supra note 126.
149. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
150. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328–31 (1816).
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era of excessive population and litigiousness, 151 is more threatening
to the draft statute’s jurisdiction stripping provision. However, the
threat is somewhat undermined by the draft statute’s focus on one
specific issue (rather than eradicating the lower federal courts
altogether) and by its provision vesting control of its personnel in the
Supreme Court (giving the Supreme Court more superintendence
power over endorsement law than it otherwise would have in a
typical jurisdiction stripping scenario).
Whether the draft statute’s vesting of jurisdiction of endorsement
claims in the Endorsement Court would survive review under the
Schor test is similarly unclear. But again, several factors weigh in
favor of the statute’s constitutionality. Much like the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) jurisdiction to hear state law
counterclaims, upheld in Schor, the draft statute also grants the
Endorsement Court power over only a “‘particularized area of law,’”
and does not give it the power to exercise “‘all ordinary powers of
district courts.’” 152 Also, the Endorsement Court’s decisions are
subject to de novo review by an Article III court, an important factor
in Schor and in other cases. 153 Although the Endorsement Court’s
orders (unlike those of the CFTC in Schor) are self-enforcing, district
court enforcement was only one of several factors examined by the
Schor court. 154 If necessary, the draft statute could be amended to
require district court enforcement, preferably with a provision
requiring district court enforcement in the great majority of cases—
for example, when the district court finds that the Endorsement
Court’s order is not “clearly erroneous” in light of Supreme Court
precedent. Finally, the “nature of the claim”—namely, that it is a
constitutional one—probably weighs somewhat against the draft
statute in the overall Schor balance. However, the fact that the
Supreme Court retains appointment, removal, and supervision power
over the Endorsement Court (a feature not present in any other
relevant case) weighs heavily the other way, because it ensures that
151. Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974).
152. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1986) (quoting
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)).
153. Id. at 852.
154. See id.
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ultimate control over the application of the endorsement test remains
in the hands of an Article III tribunal.
2. Appointment Provision
The appointment provision of the draft statute performs several
important functions. It ensures that the Supreme Court, an Article III
tribunal, maintains substantial control over the Endorsement Court,
which (as just described) is an important safeguard against an Article
III challenge to the statute. The appointment provision also ensures
that the members of the Endorsement Court possess knowledge of a
variety of religious traditions, both majority and minority, to alleviate
the majority-bias critique of the endorsement test. 155
However, there are at least three possible problems with the
appointment provision of the draft statute. First, one can plausibly
argue that vesting appointment of the Endorsement Court members in
the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Appointments Clause of
Article II. This clause provides that the President has the power (with
the advice and consent of the Senate) to appoint “Officers of the
United States,” but Congress may vest the appointment of “inferior
Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.” 156 Members of the Endorsement Court are
almost certainly “officers,” given their important duties and authority
to enter final orders; 157 thus, whether Congress can vest the power to
appoint these members in the Supreme Court (a “Court[] of Law”) 158
turns on whether they are inferior or principal officers. At one point,
the Supreme Court answered this question by applying yet another
multi-factored test, focusing on the nature and duration of the
155. There is nothing particularly special in having seven members of the Endorsement
Court, or in the specific mix of religious traditions delineated in sections 4(a)-(f) of the draft
statute. It may be the case that more (or fewer) judges would better serve the goals of the
statute, or that a different, more diverse mix of traditions would be preferable. Perhaps the
statute could be even more vague, specifying only that the members of the Endorsement Court
“shall possess a broad range of religious knowledge,” or something similar.
156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
157. Government officials who exercise “significant governmental authority” are officers
who must be appointed pursuant to the requirements of the Appointments Clause. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868
(1991).
158. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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officer’s jurisdiction, the extent of the officer’s powers and duties,
and whether the officer is subject to removal by another officer.159
Today, it seems that, at least “[g]enerally speaking,” the Court
decides the question by asking whether the officer is “supervised” by
some other officer. 160 If the officer is supervised, he is inferior; if not,
he is principal.
Although the question is by no means free from doubt, 161
substantial arguments support classifying the Endorsement Court
judges as inferior officers. In Edmond v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals
were inferior officers because their decisions were reviewable by a
higher court and because they were administratively supervised by
the Judge Advocate General. 162 Likewise, Endorsement Court judges
are administratively supervised by the Supreme Court (and can be
removed without cause), and their decisions are subject to review by
the Court. Indeed, the reviewability issue cuts even more heavily here
than in Edmond, because the Supreme Court would review decisions
of the Endorsement Court de novo, whereas the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces exercised a more narrow scope of review over the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ decisions. 163 Nor can Edmond be
distinguished on the ground that Endorsement Court Judges, because
they decide constitutional issues, serve more important purposes than
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges; the latter presided
over a variety of criminal cases, including those involving the death
penalty, 164 and therefore handled an even broader array of
constitutional issues than would the Endorsement Court judges.
Second, one might argue that, by placing qualifications on who
the Supreme Court may appoint to serve on the Endorsement Court—
namely, the “substantial knowledge” requirements contained in
159. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Applying this test, the appointment of the
Endorsement Court judges would likely, though not certainly, be constitutional. Their duties are
limited to adjudicating one area of law, and their judgments are subject to de novo review by an
Article III tribunal.
160. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997).
161. For one thing, federal district judges and federal circuit court judges are generally
considered to be principal officers. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 & n.7 (1994).
162. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664.
163. See id. at 665.
164. See id.
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sections 4(a)-(f)—the statute infringes on the Court’s Appointment
Clause power to choose whoever it wants to fill positions. In other
words, this argument asserts that the only power the Appointment
Clause grants to Congress with respect to inferior officers is to
choose which body (the President alone, a court of law, or a head of
an agency) may appoint them. Once Congress makes this choice, the
argument suggests, the body that Congress has chosen has unbridled
discretion to fill the inferior officer position.
This argument has a strong textual appeal, but it is highly unlikely
that any court would adopt it. Congress has long established
qualification restrictions with respect to both principal and inferior
officers, and the current United States Code is filled with them. 165
Moreover, Supreme Court dicta supports the notion that Congress can
impose reasonable qualification restrictions on the choice of
appointees. 166 In addition, an early Attorney General opinion concurs
with this notion, so long as the qualification restriction gives the
appointing officer significant leeway in choosing who to appoint.167
Finally, the notion that Congress can impose reasonable qualification
restrictions on appointments is not only supported by long-standing
and widespread institutional practice, but has theoretical appeal as
well. This is so because one can explain this authority as simply an
incident to Congress’ unquestioned power to create offices in the first
place.
Finally, one could argue that the Religious Test Clause of Article
VI independently prohibits the religious knowledge qualifications of
section 4(a)-(f) of the draft statute. The Religious Test Clause
provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
165. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (requiring that no more than three of the six members of
the FEC may be of the same political party); 5 U.S.C. § 8472 (providing that in making
appointments to the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, the President must consult
with various members of Congress); 10 U.S.C. § 4337 (requiring that the Chaplain of the U.S.
military must be a “clergyman”); 16 U.S.C. § 3632 (providing for appointment of Pacific
Salmon Treaty commissioners); 28 U.S.C. § 505 (requiring that the Solicitor General must be
“learned in the law”); 38 U.S.C. § 305(a)(2) (requiring that the Undersecretary of Health in
HHS must be selected without “regard to political affiliation”).
166. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926).
167. Civil Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 520 (1871).
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States.” 168 Certainly, on some level, the requirement that an appointee
have “substantial knowledge” of a particular religious tradition
sounds like a religious “test,” but the “test” of which the clause
speaks refers to “affirmations” of religious beliefs, rather than to
“examinations” of religious knowledge. 169 Perhaps one could argue
that the religious knowledge requirement serves as a proxy for
religious affiliation, and therefore that these requirements in fact
promote the very evil with which the framers were concerned when
they drafted this Clause.
I agree that the Clause should be construed to refer to true proxies
for religious affiliation, but at least two factors weigh in favor of not
finding such an illegitimate proxy present here. First, there is a real
difference between religious affiliation and religious knowledge. The
entire academic field of religious studies is based on the assumption
that possessing knowledge about a religious tradition is quite
different from believing in its tenets or truth. 170 Second, knowledge
of a religious tradition, rather than belief in its claims, is, in fact, the
qualification that best serves the purposes of the statute. Because the
endorsement inquiry focuses on what a “reasonable observer” would
think about a challenged symbol or display, rather than on what any
one adherent would think, the knowledge requirement best ensures
that the Endorsement Court judge will have some idea of what the
average adherent of the religious tradition would think about the
display. Thus, the statute does not intend to ensure that an adherent of
the religious tradition in question is selected to serve on the Court.
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Draft Statute
This section briefly discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
enacting a statute such as that proposed by this Article. Because I
argue that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, I will first
discuss the statute’s drawbacks, and then examine its benefits.
168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
169. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of
Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987).
170. For discussion of teaching about religion in an objective manner, see generally Jay D.
Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education,
and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2002).
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1. Disadvantages
At least four disadvantages to adopting the draft statute come to
mind. 171 First, as the statute’s constitutionality would certainly be
challenged 172 because it raises difficult and important constitutional
questions, 173 adopting the statute would result in expensive and timeconsuming litigation. Moreover, if the statute is found wholly
unconstitutional, the time, money, and effort spent to enact it would
be wasted, except for the fact that it may be valuable to force the
courts to weigh in on one or more of the novel issues raised.
Nonetheless, this potential problem, though real, is fairly minor
compared to the advantages of the statute.
Second, the statute places an increased administrative burden on
the Supreme Court. By requiring the Court to promulgate rules
governing Endorsement Court procedures, to appoint the judges of
the Endorsement Court, and to supervise those judges (including
possibly removing them), the statute requires the Court to undertake
additional burdensome responsibilities. On the other hand, the Court
already has many such responsibilities, and enjoys an administrative
apparatus to support its obligations. So long as Congress provides
additional funding for administrative support, the increased
administrative burden imposed by the statute is not overly
demanding. Regardless, if one views this as a significant problem,
only the appointment and removal powers must necessarily reside
with the Court (for constitutional reasons 174). Congress could
promulgate the Endorsement Court procedures itself or delegate this
duty to another body, either to one that already exists or to a new one
established by the draft statute.
171. There may certainly be other disadvantages. For example, it was pointed out at the
symposium that the draft statute may create a conflict of interest problem, since the Supreme
Court, which reviews the work of the Endorsement Court, appoints the members of that Court.
It was also pointed out that the Endorsement Court in many ways resembles the Federal Circuit,
which many believe has failed to live up to its promise as a specialized tribunal.
172. The statute, as I envision it, would not strip the courts of jurisdiction to consider its
own constitutionality; indeed, it may be wise to include a specific provision creating fast-track
jurisdiction in a single court to hear the inevitable challenge that would be brought against the
law.
173. See supra notes 141–70 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
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Third, placing the adjudication of the endorsement issue in the
hands of a non-Article III tribunal may send the unwanted message
that the right protected by the Establishment Clause’s nonendorsement norm is not particularly important. If the statute sent this
message, it would be a serious problem, although one that likely
would not outweigh the benefits of the statute, specifically with
respect to its promotion of the non-endorsement norm. 175 Although it
is certainly possible that some may receive this message from the
adoption of the statute, particularly given that the media does not
always communicate legal developments in the most accurate
fashion, it is unlikely that this is the message that most people will
receive. Not only does the statute keep the Supreme Court ultimately
in charge of enforcing the right at issue, but the statute’s very purpose
is also to make this right more robust by entrusting its enforcement to
an adjudicatory body staffed by individuals more attuned to its
importance. Because the message received will be undesirable only if
the statute’s goal somehow becomes distorted, it is unwise to decline
to pass the statute simply because of the message it might possibly
send. If such distortion appears to be a particularly likely possibility,
members of Congress responsible for this legislation could make
extra efforts to emphasize the pro-endorsement rights message
intended by the statute.
Finally, precluding lower federal court review of endorsement
questions may set an undesirable precedent that would support the
preclusion of judicial review of other important constitutional claims.
Members of Congress have periodically endorsed stripping
jurisdiction to hear claims the members disagree with from the
federal courts, including claims regarding abortion rights, school
prayer, and other controversial issues. 176 Such preclusion would not,
of course, be a good idea from a minority rights perspective or from
the perspective that federal courts should maintain the power to
control the shape and enforcement of constitutional rights generally.
If it were true that the draft statute would, in fact, set such a
precedent, this would make the statute undesirable. This is because
augmenting protection of the endorsement right is not worth the
175. See infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.
176. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 170.
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sacrifice of other more fragile, and arguably more important,
constitutional rights. However, it is unlikely that the draft statute, if
understood correctly, will set such a precedent. For one thing, the
statute maintains federal court control over the right at issue, both by
allowing for Supreme Court review and by providing for Supreme
Court oversight of the Endorsement Court itself. More importantly,
the statute’s purpose is to augment protection of the right, rather than
to undermine it. The statute’s underlying premise is that the
endorsement test is fundamentally correct, but enforced by
suboptimal decision-makers. This is very different from the premise
of other jurisdiction-stripping efforts, whose starting points are
generally that the right in question is fundamentally incorrect. Thus,
defenders of the draft statute, and minority rights more generally, can
successfully distinguish this statute from other attempts to strip the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
2. Advantages
The advantages of the draft statute outweigh its disadvantages. I
will discuss three of the advantages here, in increasing order of
importance. First, entrusting primary endorsement adjudication to
one body, instead of to numerous district courts and courts of
appeals, will unify and standardize the law governing the display of
religious symbols throughout the country. 177 This is advantageous
both with regard to specific types of displays (e.g., we would know
whether “In God We Trust” or Ten Commandments monuments
sponsored by the Fraternal Order of Eagles would be constitutional
throughout the nation) and to important questions of endorsement
law, such as those identified by Choper, Hill, and others (e.g., what
qualifies as the physical context of a display or what characteristics
should we assume the reasonable observer to possess). 178 In a sense,
of course, this argument proves too much; if uniformity and
standardization were considered to be an advantage significant
enough to justify altering the federal court system, such virtues might
177. Of course, state courts would continue to provide some variety and experimentation,
at least on issues not directly considered by the Supreme Court.
178. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
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justify the eradication of lower federal courts entirely, something I
certainly do not endorse. On the other hand, promoting uniformity
and certainty in this one small area of constitutional law may be
uniquely beneficial as compared to other areas, given the inherently
indeterminate and ambiguous nature of the endorsement test.
Second, removing endorsement claims from the lower federal
courts would free them from having to decide the many minute and
seemingly silly (to some) questions required by the endorsement test.
To the extent that courts appear undignified and even ridiculous when
they spill ink to resolve such issues as whether a display’s flowered
border is part of a challenged display, 179 whether the presence of
evergreen trees changes the meaning of a display, 180 or whether
painting a figure alters a display’s overall message, 181 the creation of
the Endorsement Court will ameliorate these difficulties. The average
First Amendment class may elicit less laughter than before, but legal
scholars, news journalists, and concerned citizens would likely hold
the federal courts in higher regard than they do now.
By far the most important advantage of the Endorsement Court,
however, is that it places the adjudication of the endorsement test into
the hands of individuals who know something about religion, who
represent a variety of majority and minority religious traditions, and
who can be expected to apply the test in a way that will promote the
test’s important purposes. As it currently stands, the endorsement test
entrusts judges who are generally members of majority religious
traditions with the responsibility of deciding whether a statesponsored display or symbol sends a message to outsiders that they
are not political equals. While it certainly is not impossible for such a
judge to make this determination in a reasonable fashion, the task is a
highly difficult one. After all, the test, by its very terms, requires
judges to get inside the heads of members of the minority tradition to
attempt to understand how that person would perceive the message.
Of course, it is far easier for someone deeply acquainted with a
minority tradition to understand how a government sponsored
message would be perceived by a member of that tradition. To the
179. Hill, supra note 66, at 522–23.
180. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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extent that one of the endorsement test’s primary purposes is to
protect the interests of those whose beliefs are not part of the
mainstream, creation of the Endorsement Court would constitute a
significant advance from the status quo.
As just one example, consider the amicus brief submitted to the
Supreme Court in the Pledge of Allegiance case (Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow) 182 on behalf of 300,000 Buddhist
Americans. 183 This unique brief, which argued that the Pledge is
unconstitutional as currently written, attempted to communicate how
the average Buddhist views the Pledge’s phrase “under God,” and to
explain why the average Buddhist believes that the phrase is
inconsistent with his or her religious beliefs. 184 The brief explained in
some detail, with relevant citations and quotations, why Buddhists do
not believe in the concept of God and why the Pledge endorses a
view of ultimate reality inconsistent with Buddhism. For example, in
summarizing its case against the Pledge, the brief argued:
When Buddhist schoolchildren recite the words describing this
as a nation “under God,” they voice the name of a deity from a
particular religious tradition that is different from their own,
they articulate a religious concept that is inconsistent with their
religion, they violate the ethical teaching prohibiting untrue
utterances, and they exalt a concept that clashes with the
“awakening to supreme wisdom” that is their religion’s very
goal. 185
One might argue that briefs such as these can alleviate the
endorsement test’s inherent majority bias by informing the Justices
how various minority religions view certain displays or symbols. The
Justices could then use this information to help them empathize with
182. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
183. Brief Amicus Curiae Buddhist Temples, Centers and Organizations Representing over
300,000 Buddhist Americans in Support of Respondents, Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624),
2004 WL 298115 [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
184. Of course, it is unclear whether the draft statute would extend to a claim regarding the
Pledge of Allegiance’s constitutionality, since the statute as currently drafted does not define
the terms “display” or “symbol.”
185. Amicus Brief, supra note 183, at 23–24. The brief goes on to argue that excusing
religious objectors from having to recite the Pledge does not cure the constitutional violation.
Id. at 24–26.
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these minority perspectives. This argument surely carries some
weight, but, ultimately, briefs such as that in the Pledge case can only
do so much. Not only are the Justices swamped by amicus briefs in
important cases—and therefore cannot possibly pay serious attention
to all of them—but reading about a religious perspective does not
translate directly into empathizing with that perspective. This is
particularly true when the perspective is communicated through the
relatively dry and straightforward vehicle of a legal brief. It is
unlikely, therefore, that the submission of amicus briefs could
significantly resolve the problem of majority bias in the application
of the endorsement test. Although it is hardly conclusive evidence, it
is notable that neither the government’s reply brief nor any of the
opinions in the Newdow case itself referred specifically to the
Buddhists’ brief.
On the other hand, it is far more likely that the perspectives
illuminated by this brief would play some role in a decision of the
Endorsement Court. If one of the members of the court has
substantial knowledge of Buddhism, that member will likely have
already internalized the message of the brief, and will bring it to bear
on his or her decision. Even if there is no member of the court with
substantial knowledge of Buddhism, those members possessing
knowledge of some other minority tradition will be more likely to
understand and empathize with the Buddhist perspective, and thus to
consider that perspective seriously when rendering a verdict on the
symbol or display in question. Either way, there is a substantial
likelihood that entrusting endorsement questions to an Endorsement
Court will result in decisions more protective of minority believers
than those rendered by the lower federal courts under the current
system.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the recent retirement of Justice O’Connor, the future of the
endorsement test is highly uncertain. For this reason, it is worth
pausing at this moment to consider the merits and drawbacks of the
test, which is one of the Rehnquist Court’s most important First
Amendment contributions. The test has endured much criticism in its
twenty years of existence, but many of these criticisms are overstated.
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The endorsement test’s most notable flaw rests not in its content, but
in the disconnect between its content and the institutional actors who
must apply it. Federal judges, who are generally members of majority
religious traditions, are not particularly well-suited for understanding
how government sponsored messages will be understood by those
who belong to minority traditions. As a result, the endorsement test,
as currently applied, risks an unfortunate majority-religion bias. One
possible solution to this problem is for Congress to entrust the
adjudication of endorsement claims to a so-called “Endorsement
Court” staffed by members with substantial knowledge of a range of
religious traditions, both majority and minority. Such a radical
solution poses its own problems, not the least of which is the
possibility that the court would be struck down on constitutional
grounds. However, the proposal also carries the quite significant
advantage of ensuring that the endorsement test is applied in a
manner that protects the very minority believers in need of its
protection. Such a solution, therefore, is worth Congress’ serious
attention.
Regardless of whether Congress ever considers such an option
(and it is, of course, quite unlikely ever to do so), considering the
possibility of creating such an Endorsement Court is a worthwhile
exercise in itself because it forces us to consider how endorsement
decisions would differ if they were made by judges who were
informed by substantial knowledge of a range of religious traditions
and perspectives and gave serious thought to how a religious symbol
or display would be understood by a reasonable observer of a
minority tradition. In a sense, then, the Endorsement Court is an
experiment in thought more than anything else. There is no reason
why judicial decision-makers (as well as policy-makers from the
other branches of government) should be unable to consider the
legitimacy, constitutional or otherwise, of a religious display from the
imagined perspective of minority believers. If Congress will not, or
cannot, place the application of the endorsement test in the hands of
minority religious believers, perhaps the message of this Article is
that the legal decision-makers vested with such power should
reimagine themselves as a way of solving the test’s most intractable
difficulties.
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